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NFIB’s New Spending Clause: Congress’ 
Limited Authority to Prevent Campus 
Sexual Assault Under Title IX 
RAVIKA RAMESHWAR* 
“Too many girls and women still confront ‘No Trespassing’ 
signs throughout educational institutions,” read the intro-
duction to the Report Card of Gender Equity written twenty-
five years after the passing of Title IX.1 Now, forty-three 
years after the passing of Title IX of the Education Amend-
ment Act, the ‘No Trespassing’ signs have not been removed. 
As of 1972, females can participate in federally funded edu-
cation programs—but it comes at a cost.2 A 2007 study re-
vealed that one out of every five female college students is 
sexually assaulted.3 The alarming rate of sexual assault on 
college campuses interferes with students’ autonomy to at-
tend a university in a non-hostile environment. 
Title IX has the potential to be a powerful tool to end sexual 
assault on campus, or at least severely reduce the prevalence 
                                                                                                             
 *  B.A. University of Florida; J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Miami 
School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Frances R. Hill for her guidance 
and feedback while writing this Comment. I would also like to thank Professor 
Donna Coker for her invaluable insight on gender-based violence and for prompt-
ing my interest in Title IX issues. A special thank you to my parents, Robbie and 
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 1 REPORT CARD ON GENDER EQUITY, A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COALITION FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS IN EDUCATION (1997), 
http://www.ncwge.org/PDF/TitleIXReport.pdf. 
 2 Title IX was passed in 1972. See Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 3 CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT STUDY 94 
(2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf. 
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of it. However, Congress’ ability to expand Title IX may de-
pend on its spending authority. This Comment addresses 
Congress’ authority to expand Title IX both before and after 
the Supreme Court’s National Federation of Independent 
Business. v. Sebelius decision. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Title IX aims to promote access to higher education, including 
the protection of students from sexual harassment and sexual as-
sault.4 Title IX lays out procedural safeguards for universities to fol-
low to ensure victim protection, and it shifts responsibility to the 
university to create a discrimination-free environment.5 Schools that 
receive federal funding must comply with Title IX or risk losing 
their federal funds.6 
The Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights 
(“OCR”), which enforces Title IX compliance, has jurisdiction over 
all schools that receive federal funds.7 To date, one hundred and six 
colleges are currently under investigation for violating Title IX.8 
Yet, no school has ever had its federal funding revoked by the OCR.9 
Legislation proposed by both sides of the congressional floor calls 
                                                                                                             
 4 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 5 Id. 
 6 ED Act Now, KNOW YOUR TITLE IX: EMPOWERING STUDENTS TO STOP 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE, http://knowyourix.org/i-want-to/take-national-action/ (last 
visited June 14, 2015); Taylor Maycan, Putting the U. Va. Scandal Into Perspec-
tive, USA TODAY (Nov. 26, 2014 8:50 PM), http://college.usato-
day.com/2014/11/26/putting-the-u-va-scandal-into-perspective/ (stating that 
“[s]chools are expected to ‘respond promptly and effectively’ to any sexual vio-
lence complaints on penalty of losing federal funding, according to the statute’s 
requirements”). 
 7 See Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title 
IX and Sexual Assaults on Campus, 40 N. Kentucky L. Rev. 49, 55–56 (2013). 
 8 Tyler Kingkade, 106 Colleges Are Under Federal Investigation For Sexual 
Assault Cases, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 6, 2015, 3:03 p.m.), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2015/04/06/colleges-federal-investigation-title-ix-
106_n_7011422.html. 
 9 See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 
2d 82, 88 n.2 (D.D.C. 2003); see also ED Act Now, supra note 6 (rationalizing 
that poor enforcement of Title IX may be because the OCR’s only enforcement 
mechanism is to revoke all federal funding, which would be detrimental to stu-
dents on financial aid). 
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for change on how the OCR can enforce Title IX.10 The Campus 
Accountability and Safety Act aims to impose a penalty of one per-
cent of the college’s operational budget for universities found not 
compliant, as opposed to all federal funding.11 
Recently, the Barack Obama Administration created a White 
House Task Force to combat campus sexual assault.12 As its first 
step, the Task Force plans to introduce legislation that will require 
universities to conduct Climate Surveys, which will be used to as-
sess the extent and environment of sexual assault on college cam-
puses.13 Many campus sexual assaults are not reported, and the Cli-
mate Survey intends to find out the actual prevalence of sexual as-
sault on campuses as well as the culture that contributes to it.14 One 
reason sexual assaults are underreported is because the policies are 
vague.15 Without a policy that clearly and unambiguously spells out 
what constitutes consent and sexual assault, students have no notice 
as to what they can report.16 The Task Force also suggests that uni-
versities implement different educational programs to create aware-
ness of sexual assault and the social responsibility to end it.17 
With sexual assault being a widespread issue on college cam-
puses, amending Title IX to require more services or programs 
would help address the issue. By amending Title IX, Congress can 
require universities to administer the Climate Survey, offer appro-
priate educational programs to prevent sexual assault, and create 
minimum standards for an unambiguous misconduct policy. 
                                                                                                             
 10 Campus Accountability and Safety Act, S. 590, 114th Cong. § 124(b)(2) 
(2015). 
 11 Press Release, Bipartisan Bill Takes Aim at Sexual Assault on College and 
University Campuses (July 30, 2014), http://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/media-
center/news-releases/campus-accountability-and-safety-act. 
 12 WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, THE FIRST REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE 
TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT ii (2014). 
 13 Id. at 8. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See Justin Neidig, Sex, Booze, and Clarity: Defining Sexual Assault On A 
College Campus, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 179, 198–200 (2009) (arguing 
that colleges should create bright-line policies to avoid underreporting). 
 16 Id. at 189–94 (arguing that the failure to define policies for students de-
prives them of notice and fails under the void-for-vagueness doctrine). 
 17 WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 9–10. 
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However, Congress’ ability to amend Title IX is grounded in its 
spending authority.18 Congress historically had broad powers to cre-
ate conditions for States to comply with in order to receive federal 
funding.19 Prior to National Federation of Independent Business. v. 
Sebelius, Congress had very specific limitations on its spending au-
thority.20 However NFIB narrowed Congress’ authority under the 
Spending Clause. Under NFIB, the limitations on Congress are am-
biguous, and it is difficult to discern what is left of Congress’ spend-
ing authority. 
If Congress were to amend Title IX to suit the needs of today’s 
society, the amendments would have to withstand the limitations on 
Congress’ spending power under NFIB. This note addresses how 
difficult it will be under NFIB for Congress to pass any amendments 
to Title IX without pushing States to the point where “pressure turns 
into compulsion.”21 Part I of this note will discuss Title IX’s history, 
requirements, and recent expansions. Part II will address the trans-
formation of the Spending Clause—from a broad power of Congress 
to its limited utility after NFIB. Part III will address if an expansion 
of Title IX will be unconstitutionally coercive under NFIB’s plural-
ity opinion, finding that it likely will be. Part IV will address how 
Congress can move forward from here—by crafting an amendment 
that will withstand the NFIB coercion test or by trying to ground 
Title IX in the Fourteenth Amendment.22 
Although the United States Supreme Court expressly stated that 
Title IX is rooted in Congress’ spending authority,23 the Court has 
yet to address whether Title IX can be upheld on any of Congress’ 
other constitutional authorities. The Fourteenth Amendment, which 
                                                                                                             
 18 See generally Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 
(1998); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 n.8 (1992). 
 19 See Reeve T. Bull, The Virtue of Vagueness: A Defense of South Dakota v. 
Dole, 56 DUKE L. J. 279, 282–85 (explaining the historically broad scope of the 
Spending Clause). 
 20 See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012) (holding that a Medicaid expansion is unconstitutional under the Spending 
Clause). 
 21 S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). 
 22 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. 
 23 See generally Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 
(1998); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 n.8 (1992). 
2015] NFIB'S NEW SPENDING CLAUSE 395 
 
guarantees individual liberties and equal protection, might be the 
“Hail Mary” for Title IX. 
I: HISTORY, EXPANSION, AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR TITLE IX 
A. University Obligations Under Title IX 
In 1965, President Johnson issued an executive order that pro-
hibited federal contractors from engaging in discriminatory employ-
ment practices based on race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.24 This executive order served as the platform for what is 
known today as Title IX.25 
Title IX was signed into law in 1972 as a part of a larger educa-
tion bill, the Education Amendment Act.26 Title IX was crafted to 
replicate the purpose of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196427—
to make sure federal funds, coming from everyone, are not used in 
a manner that discriminates against a particular class of people.28 
Title IX requires that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on 
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
                                                                                                             
 24 Executive Order 11246. The original bill in 1965 did not cover discrimina-
tion based on sex, but it was amended in 1968 to include sex discrimination. 
Lyndon B. Johnson, Executive Order 11375 - Amending Executive Order No. 
11246, Relating to Equal Employment Opportunity, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=60553 (last visited Jan. 24, 
2015). 
 25 Iram Valentine, Title IX: A Brief History, 2 HOLY CROSS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
123, 124 (1997) (referring to Executive Order 11246 as the “origin” for Title IX). 
According to Valentine, after Executive Order 11246 was amended, Bernice R. 
Sandler, a part-time professor at University of Michigan, made the connection that 
universities and colleges were barred from discriminatory practices because uni-
versities and colleges had federal contracts. Id. This finding sparked the first 
speech in Congress about gender discrimination. Id. Soon after the speech, a pol-
itician began drafting Title IX. Id. at 124–25. 
 26 Id. at 125. The bill went largely unnoticed when it was originally signed. 
Id. 
 27 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is grounded in both Congress’ 
Spending Clause authority and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Title IX 
Legal Manual, UNITED STATES DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, http://www.jus-
tice.gov/crt/about/cor/coord/ixlegal.php#31 (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). 
 28 Id. 
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program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”29 Uni-
versities are obligated to comply with Title IX because they receive 
federal financial funds.30 Title IX’s sex discrimination protections 
extend to protecting students from sexual harassment, including sex-
ual violence.31 Under Title IX, schools are required to give out no-
tice of nondiscrimination, to appoint at least one Title IX Coordina-
tor to investigate sexual discrimination claims, and to adopt and 
publish grievance procedures to remedy student and employee sex-
ual discrimination complaints.32 
Ambiguities over the obligations of educational facilities under 
Title IX prompted a “Dear Colleague Letter” from the Office for 
Civil Rights.33 The “Dear Colleague Letter” of 2011 laid out 
schools’ obligations under Title IX.34 Schools are obligated to pro-
tect students from a hostile environment on campus.35 The “Dear 
Colleague Letter” clarified that schools are required to immediately 
take action to prevent and address sexual harassment.36 When a 
school knows, or reasonably should know, about sexual harassment, 
the school is required to “promptly investigate” the situation.37 
Schools must train employees so that employees know where to re-
port sexual harassment.38 Additionally, schools should equip em-
ployees with practical information about recognizing sexual harass-
ment and violence.39 
                                                                                                             
 29 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 30 Title IX Legal Manual, supra note 27. 
 31 UNITED STATES DEP’T. OF EDUCATION OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR 
COLLEAGUE LETTER 1 (2011) [hereinafter, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER]. 
 32 34 C.F.R. § 106.9; Id. § 106.8(a); Id. § 106.8(b); Id. § 106.9(a). 
 33 DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 31. 
 34 Id. at 3–19. The letter acts complimentary to a 2001 Guidance Letter. Id. 
at 2. 
 35 Id. at 3. Even when sexual harassment or assault occurs off campus, 
schools must account for whether the off-campus conduct creates a hostile envi-
ronment for the complainant on campus. Id. at 4. 
 36 Id. at 2. 
 37 Id. at 4. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. Note that it is not required that schools train their employees with more 
than just the information necessary on how to report sexual harassment; equipping 
employees with practical information, such as dealing with student victims and 
recognizing warning signs of sexual assault, is just a recommendation. 
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Universities are left discretion to create a misconduct procedure 
as long as sexual harassment cases are handled promptly, thor-
oughly, and impartially.40 The “Dear Colleague Letter” also made it 
clear that the misconduct procedure must use a preponderance of the 
evidence standard to be in compliance with Title IX.41 Schools are 
required to give notice of the outcome of the sexual harassment com-
plaint to both parties.42 Schools must also account for the accused 
perpetrator’s due process rights.43 
Although Title IX requires only a few pivotal procedural safe-
guards, the Office of Civil Rights suggests, sometimes strongly, that 
other steps be taken.44 For example, the Office of Civil Rights sug-
gests that schools prohibit parties from personally cross-examining 
one another because of the possible trauma to the alleged victims.45 
Additionally, the Office of Civil Rights requires schools to educate 
Title IX Coordinators on issues of sexual harassment and sexual vi-
olence, but only recommends that schools educate everyone else.46 
The “Dear Colleague Letter” suggests that schools address sexual 
violence and what constitutes sexual violence at orientation pro-
grams, resident hall adviser trainings, student athlete and coach 
trainings, and school assemblies.47 The Office of Civil Rights sug-
gests that schools tell students that the school’s primary focus is on 
safety, and all other disciplinary violations will be dealt with sepa-
rately.48 Additionally, schools are recommended to tell students that 
                                                                                                             
 40 Id. 4–7. The “Dear Colleague Letter” said schools will handle investiga-
tions differently based on the circumstances; however, the school’s investigation 
must meet the requirements of being “prompt, thorough, and impartial.” Id. at 4–
5. 
 41 Id. at 11. Previously, some schools used a “clear and convincing” evidence 
standard, which is a higher evidentiary standard for the complainant to meet. The 
“Dear Colleague Letter” made it clear that any standard other than a “preponder-
ance of evidence” standard is in violation of Title IX. 
 42 Id. at 13. 
 43 Id. at 12. The Office of Civil Rights suggests that schools not allow the 
accused’s due process rights to cause delays in the Title IX investigation. 
 44 The word “should” is used 71 times in the “Dear Colleague Letter.” Id. 
 45 Id. at 12. 
 46 Id. at 4, 14–15. However, the Violence Against Women Reauthorization 
Act requires schools to offer new students programs on awareness and prevention 
of sexual violence. 
 47 Id. at 14–15. 
 48 Id. at 15. 
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alcohol or drug consumption does not make a victim at fault.49 A 
school’s failure to offer any of this information will not, by itself, 
mean the school is in violation of Title IX because the suggestions 
are not mandatory. 
Additionally, in 2013, the Violence Against Women Reauthori-
zation Act included suggestions for schools to end sexual violence 
on campus; however, schools are under no obligation to comply be-
cause they are merely suggestions.50 The suggestions included by-
stander education and better information outlets.51 
B. Recent Developments in Title IX 
In January 2014, President Barack Obama created a White 
House Task Force (“Task Force”) with the purpose of addressing 
sexual assault on college campuses.52 The first thing on the Task 
Force’s agenda is to use Climate Surveys to assess the extent of sex-
ual assault on campuses, including students’ attitudes toward and 
awareness of sexual assault.53 Schools may conduct the Climate Sur-
veys voluntarily now, but the surveys will possibly be required by 
2016.54 The Task Force will explore legislative or administrative op-
tions to mandate that schools conduct the Climate Survey.55 
The Task Force made a number of suggestions for schools as 
well. The Task Force provided a suggested sexual misconduct pol-
icy, which schools are not obligated to adopt.56 Along with that, the 
Task Force published samples of “promising policy language” to 
address certain issues.57 Although the sample sexual misconduct 
                                                                                                             
 49 Id. 
 50 See UNITED STATES DEP’T. OF EDUCATION OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 44–45 (2014) 
(clarifying that the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act only amended 
the Violence Against Women Act and the Cleary Act). 
 51 See generally Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 
113-4 (2013). 
 52 WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 12. 
 53 Id. at 8. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 12. 
 57 WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, NOT ALONE, RESOURCE GUIDE TO PREVENT 
AND IMPROVE RESPONSES TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 
(2015), https://www.notalone.gov/assets/task-force-resource-guide-sep-15.pdf. 
2015] NFIB'S NEW SPENDING CLAUSE 399 
 
policy and policy language are only suggestions, they have the po-
tential to clear up ambiguities in many misconduct policies—nota-
bly, defining consent. Title IX is silent on a consent standard, leav-
ing schools the flexibility to create their own definition of what con-
stitutes consent.58 If future legislation expands Title IX, there is po-
tential that it could include a federally mandated policy on issues 
like consent. 
Additionally, the Task Force is conducting research that will be 
disseminated to schools for their use.59 The Task Force suggests 
comprehensive education for students on issues of sexual assault 
and bystander prevention programs60 to create social responsibility 
on campus to end sexual assault.61 However, these suggestions are 
also not mandatory. 
The only portion of the Task Force’s announcement that will be 
mandatory is the Climate Survey. However, the Task Force has 
stated that the “first step” is assessing the culture of sexual assault 
                                                                                                             
 58 Nothing in the White House Task Force Report, “Dear Colleague Letter,” 
or Title IX itself mentions consent standards or policy on consent. However, de-
fining consent is a hotly debated topic among universities. Antioch College 
adopted an affirmative consent policy in 1991, which caused a backlash in criti-
cism against the consent standard to the extent that even Saturday Night Live 
made a parody about Antioch’s policy. See All Things Considered: The History 
Behind Sexual Consent Policy, NPR (Oct. 5, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/player/v2/mediaPlayer.html?action=1&t=1&is-
list=false&id=353922015&m=353922016. More recently, California has adopted 
a bill mandating universities to adopt an affirmative consent policy or risk losing 
state funding. Calif. SB-967, Student safety: sexual assault, https://leginfo.legis-
lature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SB967. 
 59 WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 12–16. 
 60 Bystander prevention programs seek to stop sexual assault by shifting the 
responsibility of intervening to third parties. While bystander intervention is only 
recommended, many schools have adopted bystander prevention programs. Uni-
versity of New Hampshire started a program called Bringing in the Bystander, 
which teaches safe methods of bystander intervention. Additionally, University 
of North Carolina Chapel Hill created a program called ONE ACTion, which 
trains third parties to recognize early signs of violence and safe prevention meth-
ods. See Bringing in the Bystander, UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE COLLEGE 
OF LIBERAL ARTS, http://cola.unh.edu/prevention-innovations/bringing-by-
stander%C2%AE (last visited Feb. 12, 2015); see also One Act Student Wellness, 
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL, https://studentwell-
ness.unc.edu/oneact (last visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
 61 WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 9. 
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on campus, implying more steps are coming.62 It would not be un-
expected if some of the Task Force’s suggestions become manda-
tory under Title IX in the future. The Task Force believes it is nec-
essary to realize the actual extent of sexual assault on campus, which 
is otherwise unknown because students do not report assaults, partly 
caused by the prevalence of acquaintance assault on campus.63 The 
Task Force compared assessing the climate of the needs for Title IX 
to when Vice President Joe Biden, a senator at the time, crafted the 
Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) and recognized the need 
to understand the scope of the problems relating to violence against 
women.64 From the conception of VAWA to now, including the 
reauthorization of the act in 2013, the act has expanded substan-
tially, offering more coverage and services to women in need.65 The 
steps the Task Force is taking inspire hope that Title IX will one day 
expand to include more relief for campus sexual assault victims, as 
well as more preventative methods, much like VAWA attempted to 
do for gender-based violence. 
C. Constitutional Grounding of Title IX 
If Congress chose to expand Title IX, it would have to pass the 
legislation under one of its enumerated Article I powers.66 The Su-
preme Court has recognized that Title IX was passed pursuant to 
Congress’ Spending Clause authority.67 The Court in Gebser v. 
Lago Vista Independent School District said “Congress attaches 
conditions to the award of federal funds under its spending power . . . 
as it has in Title IX.”68 Additionally, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
                                                                                                             
 62 Id. at ii. 
 63 Id. at 7. 
 64 Id. at 7. 
 65 See Donna Coker, VAWA @ 20: Roll Back “Prison Nation,” CUNY L. REV. 
(Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.cunylawreview.org/vawa-20-roll-back-prison-na-
tion/#fn-1624-2 (explaining that VAWA increased funding for shelter services, 
civil legal representation, and youth prevention programs and has been expanded 
to extend relief to certain immigrant victims). 
 66 U.S. CONST. art. 1. 
 67 See generally Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 
(1998); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 n.8 (1992). 
 68 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287. 
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Public School the Court found that damages could be sought for Ti-
tle IX claims even though Title IX is grounded in the Spending 
Clause.69 
Therefore, in order for Congress to pass a future bill expanding 
Title IX—whether for something as minor as a Climate Survey, 
more progressive approaches to handling sexual assault on campus, 
or mandating a sexual misconduct policy—it would have to be 
within Congress’ spending authority. Given the recent limitations 
placed on Congress’ spending authority, discussed in Part III, any 
expansion of Title IX stands on shaky grounds. 
II: THE AMORPHOUS SPENDING CLAUSE 
A. Breadth and Limitations of the Spending Clause 
Congress may “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Ex-
cises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and 
general Welfare of the United States.”70 This constitutional provi-
sion is the authority for the Spending Clause.71 Under the Spending 
Clause, Congress has the authority to grant money contingent on 
states compliance with a federal mandate.72 Congress has broad au-
thority under the Spending Clause, subject to a few limitations.73 
                                                                                                             
 69 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 n.8. 
 70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 71 Symposium, Changing Images of the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1428 
(1994) (“Congress’s spending power derives from Article I, Section 8, Clause I 
of the Constitution . . .”). 
 72 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012). 
 73 The Court recognized the breadth of Congress’ broad authority under the 
Spending Clause in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (where, in an-
alyzing the scope of the Spending Clause, the Court stated “ . . . that the power of 
Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not 
limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”). The 
Court again recognized Congress’ broad authority under the Spending Clause in 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (where the Court stated that Con-
gress has “employed the Spending Power to further broad policy objectives by 
conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with fed-
eral statutory and administrative directives”). 
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Under the Spending Clause, Congress’ authority to grant federal 
money is not limited to its enumerated Article I powers.74 
The Supreme Court explained the limitations to Congress’ au-
thority under the Spending Clause in South Dakota v Dole.75 In 
Dole, the Court held that it was within Congress’ powers to condi-
tion the receipt of federal highway funds upon adherence to a mini-
mum drinking age.76 At the time, South Dakota permitted nineteen-
year-olds to purchase beer with an alcohol content of 3.2 percent.77 
However, in 1984 Congress enacted a law enabling it to withhold a 
percentage of federal highway funds from States that did not have a 
minimum drinking age of twenty-one.78 If South Dakota refused to 
comply with the federal mandate, the State would have lost 5 percent 
of the federal funds that it could have obtained under highway 
grants.79 
While recognizing that Congress had broad authority under the 
Spending Clause, the Court laid out four express limitations to Con-
gress’ spending authority.80 First, Congress can only exercise its 
spending power in the pursuit of general welfare, as provided by the 
Constitution.81 The Court noted that to determine whether an ex-
penditure is in pursuit of the general welfare, substantial deference 
should be given to Congress’ judgment.82 Second, if Congress cre-
ates a condition for the States to receive federal funding, the condi-
tion must be unambiguous so that States can knowingly exercise 
their choice while being cognizant of the consequences of not com-
plying with the condition.83 Third, if the conditional grant is not re-
                                                                                                             
 74 S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (where Chief Justice 
Rehnquist explains that Congress may achieve objectives outside of its enumer-
ated Article 1 powers through the Spending Clause). 
 75 Id. at 207–12. 
 76 Id. at 212. 
 77 Id. at 205. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See id. at 211. 
 80 Id. at 207–08. 
 81 Id. at 207; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. provides that Congress may “lay 
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide 
for . . . general Welfare of the United States.” 
 82 S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
 83 Id. at 207. The Court in Dole gets the contractual-based language of know-
ingly consenting to the terms Congress laid out from Pennhurst State School and 
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lated to the federal interest in a particular national program, the con-
dition may be illegitimate.84 Finally, the conditional grant may be 
barred by another constitutional provision.85 
In Dole, the Court focused its analysis on the fourth and final 
requirement—an “independent constitutional bar.”86 The Court con-
cluded that the condition of a mandatory minimum drinking age was 
related to the general welfare87 and is clearly stated.88 Additionally, 
given studies that illustrated the benefits of a uniform drinking age, 
the dangers of drinking and driving, and the desire to decrease the 
incentives for young people to drink and drive, the Court concluded 
that raising the minimum drinking age is reason-ably calculated to 
address the problem.89 However, under the fourth limitation, South 
Dakota claimed that Congress exceeded its Spending Power because 
the Twenty-First Amendment barred the condition.90 The State ar-
gued that the Twenty-First Amendment excluded Congress from di-
rectly regulating the drinking age.91 The Court instead found that the 
Twenty-First Amendment did not independently bar Congress’ con-
dition.92 The “independent constitutional bar,” as defined by the 
Court, “is not . . . a prohibition on the indirect achievement of ob-
jectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly.”93 
The Court instead defines the fourth limitation to mean that States 
                                                                                                             
Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (where the Court said that “[t]he 
legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on 
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts to the terms of the “con-
tract.”). 
 84 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
 85 Id. at 208. 
 86 See id. at 208 (where the Court noted that South Dakota does not contest 
the first three limitations). See generally Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1428 (1989) (discussing the intricacies of 
the “unconstitutional condition doctrine”). 
 87 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 208–09. The Presidential Commission of Drunk Driving, Final Re-
port 11 (1983) was cited in Dole, and found that a patchwork of drinking ages 
incentivized drinking and driving because younger people would commute to a 
border State with a lower drinking age. 
 90 See id. at 209. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 210. 
 93 Id. 
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cannot be induced to engage in activities that would themselves be 
unconstitutional.94 The Court proceeded to describe examples of in-
ducing States to comply with unconstitutional measures, such as dis-
crimination and cruel and unusual punishment.95 However, States 
complying with Congress’ condition would not violate anyone’s 
constitutional rights.96 
After addressing the limitations to Congress’ spending author-
ity, the Court briefly evoked federalism principles of coercion.97 The 
Court mentioned that in some circumstances Congress’ financial in-
ducement may be coercive “as to pass the point at which ‘pressure 
turns into compulsion.’”98 The Court found that Congress did not 
coerce the States because South Dakota only stood to lose five per-
cent of its federal highway funding.99 The Court said Congress 
merely “offered relatively mild encouragement” to raise the mini-
mum drinking age to twenty-one.100 
Under Dole, Congress’ authority to spend was interpreted 
broadly. Without expressly stating so, the Court analyzed the limi-
tations on the Spending Clause narrowly.  Under the analysis of an 
“independent constitutional bar,” the Court stated extreme examples 
of constitutional infringements and emphasized the constitutional 
rights of individuals who would be affected, rather than States lib-
erties.101 Additionally, the Court handled the issue of coercion 
briefly, almost as an afterthought to the analysis of the limitations 
on the Spending Clause. The Court, seemingly unconvinced by the 
Petitioner’s coercion argument,102 cited back to a case that said 
                                                                                                             
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 210–211. 
 96 Id. at 211. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See id. (citing to Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 
590 (1937)). 
 99 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See id. at 208–211. However, the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine” is 
not as simple as the Dole opinion made it seem. See Sullivan, supra note 86 (“Yet 
the Court’s unconstitutional conditions rulings display serious inconsistencies in 
their account of coercion . . . Court has never developed a coherent rationale for 
determining when such offers rise to the level of ‘coercion.’”). 
 102 The Court says the argument of coercion is one of rhetoric rather than fact, 
given that South Dakota only stood to lose five percent of its federal highway 
funding. Id. at 211. 
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equating Congress’ motives with coercion would “plunge the law 
into endless difficulties.”103 The Court deferred to Congress’ general 
welfare rationale and qualified its action of conditioning a minimum 
drinking age as encouragement, rather than coercion.104 
B. Coercion as Principle of Federalism 
Although coercion is only mentioned briefly in Dole, the under-
pinning concerns about whether States are being coerced to comply 
with federal regulation strikes to the heart of federalism issues. To 
provide a healthy nexus between States and the Federal Govern-
ment, the Constitution reserves powers to the States that are not del-
egated or prohibited elsewhere in the Constitution.105 Included in 
federalism is the notion that the Federal Government may not act 
upon States to enforce a federal regulatory program.106 
In New York v. United States, the Court held that a provision of 
a federal act violated Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause 
because the States would be coerced to comply with the act.107 In 
New York, Congress passed an act regulating radioactive waste and 
offered incentives to States that complied.108 One of the incentives, 
called the “Take Title Provision,” said that States would have to take 
title over the radioactive waste generated within their respective 
State, as an alternative to complying with Congress’ regulations.109 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, reasoned that Congress 
                                                                                                             
 103 Id. (citing Charles. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–90 
(1937) (where the Court held that a Social Security tax did not coerce the states)). 
The Court in Charles. C. Steward Machine Co. said, “every rebate from a tax 
when conditioned upon conduct is in some measure a temptation. But to hold that 
motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in endless dif-
ficulties.” Id. The case is again cited in a landmark Supreme Court decision re-
garding the Affordable Care Act, which is discussed later. 
 104 S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). 
 105 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 106 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (where the Court 
states, “The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer 
a federal regulatory program”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) 
(holding that Congress exceeded its authority by passing a bill that commandeered 
local law enforcement to perform tasks required by a federal statute). 
 107 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992). 
 108 Id. at 152–54. 
 109 Id. at 174–75. States would also be liable for all damages resulting from a 
failure to take possession of the radioactive waste. Id. at 153. 
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“crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion”110 
because Congress asked the states to “choose” between two things 
that Congress, standing alone, did not have the authority to do.111 
Congress on its own would not be able to force a State to implement 
legislation.112 Additionally, Congress, on its own, would not be able 
to force States to take title to radioactive waste because it would be 
commandeering the States to comply with federal regulatory 
schemes.113 Therefore, Congress could not ask States to comply 
with the act or, as a consequence of choosing not to comply, take 
title to waste in service of federal regulation.114 The Court said the 
Take Title provision coerced the States by not providing an altera-
tive path to following Congress’ regulation—either States comply 
with the act or States comply with taking title to the waste.115 
Although the Take Title provision was not held unconstitutional 
under the Spending Clause, the Court did recognize Congress’ au-
thority under the Spending Clause.116 The Court said that Congress 
could influence a State’s legislature by creating conditions that at-
tach to federal funds.117 However, the Court noted that when the 
Federal Government compels a State to regulate, there is no political 
accountability.118 The Court explains that when a State official acts 
contrary to the beliefs of his or her constituents, the individuals can 
vote for him or her out of office.119 However, when the federal gov-
ernment forces the States to regulate, constituents may disapprove 
                                                                                                             
 110 Id. at 175. 
 111 Id. at 177. 
 112 Id. at 176–77. 
 113 Id. at 175. 
 114 Id. at 175–76. 
 115 Id. at 177. 
 116 Congress offered three incentives in New York. The first incentive for com-
plying with Congress’ act was monetary, and the Court held it to be constitutional 
under Congress’ spending and commerce power. Id. at 152–53, 171. Specific to 
the Spending Clause, the Court held that conditioning federal grants on States 
achieving benchmarks set out by Congress was constitutional under the four lim-
itations in Dole. Id. at 171–72 (citing to S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 
(1987)). 
 117 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 168. 
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of the state official, rather than the federal officials responsible for 
the regulation.120 
However, although coercion is a proper concern to analyze when 
Congress acts upon the States, Congress must cross the line between 
encouragement and coercion, or to the point where “pressure turns 
into compulsion.”121 In Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 
the Court explained that to reach the point where “pressure turns into 
compulsion . . . would be a question of degree, at times, perhaps, of 
fact.”122 But the Court seemed skeptical of ever reaching this point, 
even airing skepticism at whether the Federal Government could 
compel a State to act.123 Although the Court in New York found Con-
gress’ Take Title provision to be coercive, the first time a provision 
was struck down as coercive under the Spending Clause was in Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (“NFIB”).124 
C. Coercion and Economic Dragooning under NFIB 
Even with Congress’ broad spending power authority, the Court 
held that Congress exceeded its spending power in NFIB.125 In 
NFIB, the Court addressed Congress’ authority in passing the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“Affordable Care 
Act”).126 Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to increase the 
number of Americans with health insurance and to make health care 
more affordable.127 The Court addressed: 1) individual mandate, 
                                                                                                             
 120 Id. at 167. 
 121 S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (citing to Charles. C. Steward Mach. 
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–90 (1937)). 
 122 Davis, 301 U.S. 548 at 590. 
 123 Id. at 590 (the Court had to assume for purposes of the argument that the 
Nation could compel the State, saying, “[n]othing in the case suggests the exertion 
of a power akin to undue influence, if we assume that such a concept can ever be 
applied with fitness to the relations between state and nation.”). 
 124 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2630 (2012) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (Justice Ginsburg, joined only by Justice Sotomayor, empha-
sized that this is “the first time ever” the Court has ruled that Congress exceeded 
its authority under the Spending Clause by coercing the States). Eric Turner, Pro-
tecting from Endless Harm: A Roadmap for Coercion Challenges After N.F.I.B. 
v. Sebelius, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 503, 508 (2014) (discussing coercion as a 
dormant analysis for the Spending Clause up until NFIB). 
 125 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012). 
 126 Id. at 2577. 
 127 Id. at 2580. 
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which required individuals to purchase health care coverage; and 2) 
a Medicaid expansion, which required States to offer health care to 
individuals who fell below a certain poverty bracket.128 
The Court held that the Affordable Care Act was constitutional 
based on Congress’ authority to tax.129 The Court also held that the 
Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit.130 Additionally, the Court 
held that the individual mandate violated Congress’ authority under 
the Commerce Clause because the Commerce Clause regulates ex-
isting commercial activity.131 Chief Justice Roberts said the individ-
ual mandate does not regulate existing commercial activity, but ra-
ther compels individuals to purchase health care and “become active 
in commerce.”132 
Additionally, the Court in NFIB narrowed Congress’ authority 
under the Spending Clause, holding that States were coerced to com-
ply with a Medicaid expansion provision. Although NFIB was a plu-
rality decision, seven Justices concluded that Congress did not have 
the authority to pass the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion 
under the Spending Clause.133 The Court saw the Medicaid expan-
sion to be far more than mild encouragement, instead calling the ex-
pansion “a gun to the head.”134 
Prior to the Affordable Care Act, the Medicaid program only re-
quired States to cover “needy individuals.”135 The program covered 
pregnant women, children, needy families,136 the blind, the elderly, 
                                                                                                             
 128 Id. at 2580–81. 
 129 Id. at 2593–2600. 
 130 Id. at 2582–84. 
 131 Id. at 2587. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, Justice Kagan and the dissenting Jus-
tices—Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito agreed 
the Affordable Care Act exceeded the Spending Clause. Id. at 2666–67. The only 
dissenting Justices on the issue were Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the concurring 
and dissent, and Justice Sotomayor, who joined her. Id. at 2609, 2629–44 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting). 
 134 Id. at 2604. 
 135 Id. at 2601. 
 136 States had discretion in exercising coverage levels for needy families. 
States, on average, covered unemployed parents who were thirty-seven percent 
below the poverty line and employed parents who were sixty-three percent below. 
Id. 
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and the disabled.137 Whereas States were required to provide health 
care to those who fell below a specific income level in order to re-
ceive their federal funding for Medicaid, the Medicaid expansion 
required States to offer coverage to all individuals under the age of 
sixty five that have incomes below 133 percent of the poverty 
line.138 Failing to meet the new requirement under the Medicaid ex-
pansion would result in a State losing all of its Medicaid funding.139 
The average State allocates twenty percent of its spending to Medi-
caid programs, and the federal funds cover fifty to eighty-three per-
cent of that Medicaid funding.140 Revoking all federal Medicaid 
funding could amount to over ten percent of a State’s overall 
budget.141 
1. FEDERALISM ISSUES: INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES, POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Whereas in Dole, the Court expressly listed the limitations on 
the Spending Clause and then briefly mentioned the threat of coer-
cion, here, Chief Justice Roberts started off with the discussion of 
coercion.142 According to the plurality opinion,143 Congress’ threat 
to revoke all of the Medicaid funding to a State coerces the States to 
comply with the federal regulation because it deprives the States of 
“a genuine choice” to accept the condition.144 The plurality 
acknowledged Congress’ power to attach conditions to federal 
grants to create incentives for States to comply under the Spending 
Clause; however, the opinion quickly juxtaposed those spending 
powers against Congress’ spending limitations.145 Rather than dis-
cussing Congress’ Spending Clause limitations as outlined in Dole, 
the Court explained that Congress’ authority is limited when its acts 
                                                                                                             
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 2601. 
 139 Id. at 2604. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 2605. 
 142 See id. at 2602. 
 143 Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kagan and Justice Breyer signed onto the 
plurality opinion. 
 144 See id. at 2608. 
 145 See id. at 2602. 
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run contrary to the federalism system.146 The Court said that there is 
a heightened danger of federalism issues arising under the Spending 
Clause because of Congress’ authority to implement policies that it 
otherwise could not be able to under its enumerated powers through 
conditional grants.147 Without limiting Congress to the confines of 
federalism, the Court warned that too much power would be vested 
in a central government and individual liberties would suffer.148 
The Court held that Congress was commandeering States to act 
on its behalf.149 By forcing states to regulate, Congress threatened 
individual liberties and created an issue of political accountability, 
Chief Justice Roberts pointed out.150 The problem of political ac-
countability presented itself in New York v. United States, as men-
tioned earlier.151 According to the plurality, if States are forced to 
regulate on behalf of the federal government, then constituents 
might wrongly place the blame on state politicians if they are dis-
pleased.152 In this scenario, the Court said the federal government is 
“insulated” from criticism.153 However, if States have the right to 
choose whether or not to comply to a condition in order to receive 
funds, then the blame constituents might place on the State would 
be warranted since those elected officials chose to comply.154 
By focusing on federalism issues, the Court’s analysis shifted 
from analyzing the few, and otherwise widely accepted, limitations 
on Congress’ constitutional authority under the Spending Clause 
and instead focused on a state sovereignty argument, rooted in the 
                                                                                                             
 146 See id. at 2602 (where the Court focuses on federalism issues limiting the 
Spending Clause). 
 147 Id. at 2603. Note that the Court expressly said Congress’ authority under 
the Spending Clause is not limited to its enumerated Constitutional powers; yet, 
here the Court says Congress using power outside of its enumerated power is a 
danger to the federalism structure. See S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 204 
(1987); compare Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 148 Id. at 2602. 
 149 Id. at 2602. Here, the Court cites back to New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 188 (1992) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
 150 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602–03. 
 151 New York, 505 U.S. at 167–68. 
 152 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 153 Id. at 2602 (citing back to New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 169). 
 154 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602–03. 
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Tenth Amendment.155 Although Dole mentioned compulsion, the 
Court barely touched on federalism issues of state sovereignty, in-
dividual liberties, and political accountability.156 
2. COERCION AND ECONOMIC DRAGOONING 
Nevertheless, the Court said that the Medicaid expansion is an 
instance of Congress commanding the States to regulate and sur-
passes the point where “pressure turns into compulsion.”157 The 
Court explains that in Dole, South Dakota only stood to lose five 
percent of its federal highway funds by not complying with Con-
gress’ condition.158 Here, in contrast, a non-complying State would 
lose all of its federal Medicaid funding, as opposed to only a small 
percentage of the funding being at risk.159 Whereas in Dole, Con-
gress only threatened to withhold the amount of less than one-half 
percent of the State’s total budget, here a State could lose over ten 
percent of its overall budget by not complying.160 The hefty risk of 
funding being revoked, the plurality says, is “economic dragooning” 
and States have no option other than to comply with the federal con-
dition to the grant, even in acquiescence.161 
                                                                                                             
 155 See generally Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebe-
lius: The Example of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 592, 592–93 
(2013) (discussing that the plurality citing back to New York and Printz implies 
that it merged the Spending Clause analysis with a Tenth Amendment argument 
of state sovereignty). 
 156 See generally S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 203–11 (1987). 
 157 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602. Although the Court dis-
cussed political accountability and individual liberties, which were not in Dole, 
discussion of the point where “pressure turns into compulsion” is in both Dole 
and Charles. C. Steward Machine Co., although both cases held that the circum-
stances had not reached that point. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211; Charles. C. Steward 
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937). 
 158 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604. Here, the Court also makes 
it a point to note that States in Dole did not receive “new money” for complying 
with the drinking age condition. This could be the Court alluding to their analysis 
of compulsion in NFIB. States were offered “new money” for complying with the 
Medicaid expansion then this would change the entire compulsion analysis, as 
States would have notice of the condition before agreeing and relying upon the 
money. 
 159 See id. at 2604–05. 
 160 Id. at 2605. 
 161 Id. 
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3. THE CONDITION REQUIRED WOULD IMPLEMENT AN ENTIRELY 
SEPARATE PROGRAM 
Additionally, the plurality said that the Medicaid expansion un-
der the Affordable Care Act is not the same program as the existing 
Medicaid program, but a different program entirely.162 Under Dole, 
Congress must make conditions to federal grants unambiguous.163 
In the act that contains the Medicaid provisions, Congress main-
tained the right to alter or amend the act.164 Although the Govern-
ment argued that the Medicaid expansion is just one of many exam-
ples of Congress altering the act, the Court says that the expansion 
cannot properly be viewed as a modification just because Congress 
titled it as one.165 The Court argues that original Medicaid program 
protected categories of “needy” people—the disabled, the elderly, 
and families with independent children who fell below a designated 
income bracket.166 In the past, Congress’ modifications to Medicaid 
were still confined to “needy” categories of people.167 However, the 
Court found the Medicaid expansion to be “a shift” that “trans-
formed” Medicaid into a “comprehensive national plan to provide 
universal health insurance coverage.”168 Rather than just covering 
“the neediest among us,” the Court said the new program would 
cover a much broader population.169 Additionally, the Court points 
                                                                                                             
 162 See id. (“The Medicaid expansion, however, accomplishes a shift in kind, 
not merely degree.”). 
 163 S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). The Court cites back to 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), where 
the Court likened a State accepting a condition under the Spending Clause to a 
contract’s offer and acceptance. Dole embodied the logic of that case in its third 
limitation: If Congress creates a condition for the States to receive federal funding, 
the condition must be unambiguous so that States can knowingly exercise their 
choice while being cognizant of the consequences of not complying with the con-
dition. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
 164 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012). 
 165 See id. 
 166 Id. at 2605–06. 
 167 See id. at 2606. Justice Ginsburg argues that this is no different than previ-
ous Medicaid expansions, including expansions that covered pregnant women and 
more children; however, the Court said that those expansions were mere expan-
sions of caring for “families with dependent children,” which was already cov-
ered. Id. at 2634–35. 
 168 Id. at 2605–06. 
 169 Id. at 2606. 
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to Congress’ funding of the newly covered individuals and the fact 
that Congress allowed for less coverage for the newly covered indi-
viduals than the previously covered categories of people to show 
that Congress crafted a new health care program.170 Unlike Con-
gress’ prior modifications to Medicaid, the Court finds this modifi-
cation to be a major change.171 
The Court said that States had no way of anticipating Congress’ 
dramatic change to Medicaid.172 Therefore, because States must 
knowingly and voluntarily agree to Congress’ conditions on federal 
grants, States had no notice of the Medicaid expansion because it is 
an entirely new program.173 The Court said that Congress would be 
able to offer separate funds for States to comply with the Medicaid 
expansion.174 However, Congress may not take away funding from 
existing Medicaid funds for States who opt not to comply with Con-
gress’ new program.175 
By arguing that the Medicaid expansion is an entirely different 
program than the Medicaid program prior to the Affordable Care 
Act, Chief Justice Roberts makes a coercion argument similar to the 
one in New York. In New York, the Court held that under either op-
tion States chose, they would be following Congress’ regulatory 
scheme—either by accepting the radioactive act’s terms and receiv-
ing the funding or by having to regulate waste themselves.176 Simi-
larly, here, Chief Justice Roberts argues that Congress will penalize 
the States for not accepting the condition.177 If the States accept, they 
will have to cover more individuals and abide by Congress’ regula-
tion. However, if they choose not to accept the expansion—a new 
program, according to the plurality—they will lose funding for the 
original Medicaid plans, an entirely separate program.178 The Court 
uses the premise that the Medicaid expansion is a separate program 
                                                                                                             
 170 See id. 
 171 Id. (where the Court said “[p]revious Medicaid amendments simply do not 
fall into the same category as the one at stake here,” and that prior modifications 
“can hardly be described as a major change”). 
 172 See id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 2607. 
 175 Id. 
 176 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175–76 (1992). 
 177 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2607. 
 178 Id. 
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for dual purposes—to reach the conclusion that States could not 
have anticipated the expansion and to say that Congress is forcing 
the States to comply with a new program or risk losing funding from 
the original, separate program.179 
4. JUSTICE GINSBURG’S DISSENT 
Although the Court determined that Congress’ Affordable Care 
Act Medicaid expansion overstepped Congress’ Spending Clause 
authority by reaching the point where “pressure turns into compul-
sion,” the Court made no attempt to define the crossing over point 
between pressure and compulsion.180 
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor dissented on the Court’s 
Spending Clause holding, pointing out that this is the first time the 
Court ever found that Congress abused its spending authority by 
compelling States to act.181 Justice Ginsburg said that it is not out-
side of Congress’ authority to expand Medicaid in the manner that 
the Affordable Care Act calls for.182 Congress can define the limits 
of the programs it gives federal funding to.183 If Congress were to 
repeal the existing Medicaid and then reenact the law to include the 
new expansion, Congress would not be exceeding its authority, Jus-
tice Ginsburg said.184 However, requiring Congress to repeal and 
reenact a law, when it could be amended in the alternative, would 
                                                                                                             
 179 See id. at 2605–07. Justice Ginsburg characterizes Chief Justice Roberts’ 
premises as follows: First, the Medicaid expansion is a new, separate program 
from the original Medicaid program. Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg. J., dissenting). There-
fore, Congress is threatening States to take away funds from an old program in 
order to coerce them to accept the new program. Id. Second, the expansion was 
unforeseeable by the States because the expansion is so expansive. Id. Third, the 
amount States stand to lose by not accepting Congress’ condition leaves them no 
choice but to participate in the expansion. Id. Therefore, for all those reasons, the 
expansion is coercive. Id. 
 180 See id. at 2606 (where the Court said that, similar to the Court in Charles 
C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–90 (1937), it “did not at-
tempt to ‘fix the outermost line’ where persuasion gives way to coercion” and that 
it was instead enough to reach the conclusion that the Medicaid expansion sur-
passed that line). 
 181 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 182 See id. at 2629–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 183 Id. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 184 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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be ritualistic and serve no federal interest, according to the dis-
sent.185 Instead, allowing Congress to amend the law to include a 
larger covered population embraces cooperative federalism.186 Jus-
tice Ginsburg asked, “[b]y what right does a court stop Congress 
from building up without first tearing down?”187 
Additionally, where Chief Justice Roberts qualified the Medi-
caid expansion as an infringement on state sovereignty, Justice 
Ginsburg sees Medicaid as “a prototypical example of federal-state 
cooperation in serving the Nation’s general welfare.”188 Instead of 
the federal government creating a uniform health care system, Med-
icaid gives States discretion to allocate the funding based on the 
State’s needs, so long as they are not in violation of the federal re-
quirements.189 
While the plurality maintains that Congress structured the ex-
pansion as a separate program, Justice Ginsburg wrote that the pro-
grams are the same, not separate.190 At the crux of Chief Justice 
Roberts’ argument that the Medicaid expansion is coercive is the 
premise that the expansion is an entirely separate program.191 By 
reaching the conclusion that the Medicaid expansion is a separate 
program from the existing Medicaid program, Chief Justice Roberts 
is able to establish that States could not anticipate the expansion.192 
Additionally, by arguing that the program is separate, Chief Justice 
Roberts is able to reach the conclusion that Congress is threatening 
to take funding away from another program for noncompliance with 
the new program.193 Justice Ginsburg disagrees with the plurality’s 
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initial premise that the programs are separate by looking to the pur-
pose of both the original Medicaid program and the Medicaid ex-
pansion.194 Both the original Medicaid program and the Medicaid 
expansion seek to provide health care coverage for those who need 
it.195 In the past, Congress expanded the original Medicaid program 
to meet its purpose of providing health care to those who need it, 
amending the program over fifty times since its enactment in 
1965.196 Annual funding and services covered by Medicaid have in-
creased since 1966, and services have been offered to a larger pro-
portion of the population.197 Notably, in the late 1980’s, Congress 
expanded Medicaid to cover pregnant women and expanded the 
population of children covered.198 Congress’ past expansions of 
Medicaid extended Medicaid covered to millions of people.199 
Therefore, Justice Ginsburg reasoned, the Medicaid expansion un-
der the Affordable Care Act is the same program as the original 
Medicaid program.200 
The Chief Justice commented on Justice Ginsburg’s argument 
in the plurality opinion, explaining that the prior expansions simply 
broadened the amount of needy families covered.201 However, Jus-
tice Ginsburg maintains that the Affordable Care Act Medicaid ex-
pansion is no different.202 She said Medicaid was developed to pro-
tect the “needy,” and the Medicaid expansion simply expands the 
definition of whom Congress considers needy.203 Congress has the 
authority to set these standards because Congress has the authority 
to set the limits to the programs it funds and to adjust spending pro-
grams accordingly to meet the needs of “the general welfare.”204 
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Additionally, Justice Ginsburg disagrees that States could not 
anticipate the Medicaid expansion.205 In Pennhurst and later in 
Dole, the Court held that Congress must make conditions on federal 
grants unambiguous so that States can knowingly accept the terms 
of the condition.206 Chief Justice Roberts argues that States could 
not anticipate a major shift in Medicaid that, under the plurality’s 
opinion, forces a State to accept an entirely new Medicaid pro-
gram.207 However, Justice Ginsburg found that the Affordable Care 
Act has met the standard of unambiguously telling States what is 
required of them to receive future funding.208 Through a statutory 
provision allowing Congress to modify the act, coupled with the past 
modifications of Medicaid, States had notice that the act could be 
changed, like it was under the Affordable Care Act.209 She said the 
Affordable Care Act clearly tells States that they must extend eligi-
bility of Medicaid to adults with incomes less than 133 percent of 
the federal poverty line.210 Nowhere in Pennhurst211 does the Court 
state that Congress is under the obligation to tell States about future 
modifications to an act before the State accepts the condition.212 Jus-
tice Ginsburg finds that Congress was under no obligation in 1965, 
at the time Medicaid was enacted, to disclose what size and how 
expansive Medicaid might become.213 Additionally, as discussed 
above, Congress has expanded Medicaid coverage and amended the 
act since 1966.214 Congress also maintained “[t]he right to alter, 
amend, or repeal and provision of Medicaid” in the Social Security 
Act, which contains the Medicaid act.215 Justice Ginsburg points out 
that the provision does not limit Congress to only “somewhat” alter 
or “amend, but not too much,” contrary to what she said the Chief 
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Justice would prefer.216 Therefore, Congress unambiguously told 
States what is required of them in order to receive Medicaid funding, 
according to Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion. Additionally, 
States had constructive and expressed notice of Medicaid expan-
sions.217 
Justice Ginsburg reminded the Court that States still have the 
opportunity to receive Medicaid funds if they accept Congress’ con-
ditions.218 Congress is not taking money from an existing fund, but 
requiring that States extend Medicaid coverage to more of their  
“needy population.”219  According to Justice Ginsburg, “Congress is 
simply requiring States to do what States have long been required to 
do to receive Medicaid funding: comply with the conditions Con-
gress prescribes for participation.”220 
Most importantly, Justice Ginsburg pointed to the inconclusive 
future of the Spending Clause following the NFIB holding.221 She 
poses the question of how future litigants and judges are to assess 
whether a State has a legitimate choice to accept conditions of a fed-
eral grant without the Court fixing “the outermost line” and explain-
ing how to determine whether “pressure gives way to coercion.”222 
She argues that under the NFIB holding, courts will be left to deter-
mine the point where “pressure gives way to coercion” under a num-
ber of factors, all of which could lead to inconsistent answers.223 
Among the questions likely to be posed, she said, are whether the 
courts will measure the number of dollars at risk if the States do not 
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comply, the portion the federal grant plays in the State’s budget, and 
whether the Court will only look to the budget of the suing State or 
a group of States.224 Or, she questioned, will it come down to the 
State officials’ fear of misplaced political accountability?225 
Another question left open after NFIB is how Congress will 
know whether it is within its limited confines of the Spending 
Power, and how can it craft legislation that does not coerce the States 
under the plurality’s opinion. What we do know after NFIB is that 
the largest federally funded bill was, in part, knocked down as coer-
cive. With education being the second highest federally funded item, 
behind Medicaid,226 what will the future of education policy rooted 
in the Spending Clause be after NFIB? 
III: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF POTENTIAL TITLE IX 
AMENDMENTS AFTER NFIB 
After NFIB, the Spending Clause is a conceptual minefield for 
Congress. Under Dole, limitations on Congress’ spending authority 
were clearly laid out in a brief opinion. The Court provided a struc-
ture of limitations on Congress and it only briefly evoked issues of 
federalism. After NFIB, limitations on Congress’ spending authority 
are ambiguous. While Chief Justice Roberts reached a conclusion, 
it is unclear which argument by itself, if any, would be enough to 
make legislation unconstitutional under the Spending Clause. With-
out a definition of the point where “pressure turns into compul-
sion,”227 Congress is left in the dark when passing progressive bills 
under the Spending Clause. 
With Title IX requirements expanding, through clarifications by 
the Office of Civil Rights, the White House Task Force, or legisla-
tion, Congress will have to be exceedingly careful when implement-
ing any additional requirements because Title IX is rooted in the 
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Spending Clause. Issues relating to Title IX expansion will hit Con-
gress’ floor as early as 2016, according to the White House Task 
Force Report.228 The question turns to what the fate of Title IX leg-
islation will be in the future. 
A. Amending Title IX is Within Congress’ Spending Authority 
Under Dole 
Under Dole’s limitations on the Spending Clause, any of the pro-
posed suggestions for schools would be constitutional if they were 
required under Title IX. The first limitation outlined in Dole is 
whether Congress is exercising its spending power pursuant to the 
general welfare, with deference given to Congress in that determi-
nation.229 Here, anything Congress might pass under Title IX would 
be in pursuit of the “general welfare” of protecting students from 
sexual assault. Second, Congress’ condition for the States to receive 
federal funding must be unambiguous so that States can knowingly 
exercise their choice of complying with the condition.230 Under this 
requirement, Congress would have to clearly spell out the additional 
requirements when amending Title IX. Al- though Title IX origi-
nally posed a problem with ambiguities, the Office of Civil Rights 
added clarity through the “Dear Colleague Letter.”231 However, if 
any of the recommendations in the “Dear Colleague Letter” or in the 
Task Force were to become mandatory, universities would have no-
tice. The “Dear Colleague Letters” and the White House Task Force 
Report clearly laid out how schools can implement suggested pro-
grams and provide research for schools to use when creating those 
programs.232 If any of the suggestions became a requirement under 
an amendment to Title IX, universities already have instructive ma-
terials to look at.233 Third, the conditional grant must be related to 
                                                                                                             
 228 WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE FIRST, supra note 12, at 8. 
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the federal interest in the particular national program.234 Here, ex-
pansions of Title IX would meet the same federal interest as Title 
IX currently does. Fourth, the condition must be constitutional on 
its own.235 In Dole, the Court listed egregious examples of constitu-
tional bars, like requiring a State to discriminate.236 Here, a Title IX 
expansion would be doing just the opposite—it would be requiring 
the States to not discriminate based on gender, which is perfectly 
constitutional. However, Congress would have to be cautious if 
amending Title IX in any manner that might abridge the alleged as-
saulter’s due process rights because that would be an “independent 
constitutional bar.”237 
Essentially, under Dole, the constitutional analysis for expand-
ing Title IX to encompass more services would not vary much from 
what the original discussion on passing Title IX under the Spending 
Clause would have been, if a discussion occurred. Even though Dole 
laid out limitations to Congress’ spending authority, those limita-
tions did little to abridge Congress’ powers.238 However, an analysis 
of Title IX and any expansions of it under NFIB’s plurality would 
reach an opposite conclusion. Even as NFIB evokes standards laid 
out in Dole, without expressly citing to each of them, the Court’s 
approach to the analysis is starkly different. By focusing a Spending 
Clause analysis on federalism issues with undefined standards, like 
the point where “pressure turns into compulsion,”239 the Court made 
it virtually impossible for Congress to know whether an amendment 
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to Title IX will pass the invisible constitutional threshold of coer-
cion. At best, Congress could assume that legislation expanding Ti-
tle IX will be found unconstitutionally coercive, under NFIB’s plu-
rality opinion. 
B. Amending Title IX Likely Will Not Be Within Congress’ 
Spending Authority Under NFIB 
1. FEDERALISM ISSUES: INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES, POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
If Title IX is amended, the amendments must not abridge indi-
vidual liberties or the sovereignty of the state.240 In NFIB, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts began the discussion of the Spending Clause by ad-
dressing the federalism issues at stake.241 Amending Title IX to in-
clude any of the recommended programs would pose no impedi-
ments on individual liberties for the complainant. In fact, amending 
Title IX to include better training, programs that raise awareness, 
bystander education programs, or a uniform consent standard could 
lead to less campus sexual assault. Therefore, amending Title IX 
would increase student victims’ individual liberties because it will 
reinforce their autonomy by allowing them to attend a university and 
get an education absent the prevalent threat of being sexually as-
saulted.242 
Although amending Title IX to include more protections and 
services for victim will not abridge individual liberties, it creates an 
issue of political accountability. Chief Justice Roberts mentioned 
political accountability, although he gave no insight on how much 
weight, if any, this had in his decision of finding the Affordable Care 
Act coercive.243 The issue of political accountability poses a prob-
lem under Title IX as a whole, even without being amended. As op-
posed to the scenario of political accountability laid out in New York 
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or NFIB, where the federal lawmakers were “insulated” from being 
held accountable because State actors were forced to implement fed-
eral regulations, here there’s another party in the mix—the univer-
sity.244 A university’s change in policy might be the doing of the 
university, the state,245 or the federal government. Therefore, con-
stituents would be confused about whom to hold accountable under 
this regime. 
Despite creating an issue of political accountability, Title IX is 
a prime example of cooperative federalism.246 Cooperative federal-
ism is not considered in the plurality of NFIB, but Justice Ginsburg 
mentions it in her dissent.247 Just as Medicaid allows for States to 
create their own regulation, provided that those regulations meet 
federal standards, Title IX also allows for universities to regulate. 
Title IX gives discretion to universities in drafting their own mis-
conduct policies, creating their own procedures for misconduct 
hearings, and implementing misconduct findings.248 In fact, all that 
Title IX truly requires is that policies be disseminated so that stu-
dents have notice, Title IX coordinators be trained and accessible, 
and complaints be handled promptly, thoroughly, and impartially.249 
Therefore, the federal government and universities work together to 
make Title IX effective. Under Title IX amendments, universities 
might have less discretion, just as how under the Medicaid expan-
sion States had less discretion in NFIB; however, the university will 
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still have discretion when enforcing regulations so long as it does 
not violate the federal requirements. Although cooperative federal-
ism seems appealing because it creates a system where both the 
States and federal government work together to meet an end goal, 
the cooperative nature of Medicaid was not enough to save the ex-
pansion in NFIB. Accordingly, absent any mention of cooperative 
federalism in the NFIB plurality, the cooperative nature of Title IX 
will likely not be enough to save an expansion of Title IX. There-
fore, although Title IX safeguards, rather than abridges, individual 
liberties and provides a platform for cooperative federalism, an 
amendment to Title IX could be unconstitutional because it could 
prevent political accountability. 
2. COERCION AND ECONOMIC DRAGOONING 
a. Unlike in NFIB, Title IX Expansions Are Not A Separate 
Program 
In order to reach the conclusion that the Medicaid expansion was 
coercive, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the expansion was a sep-
arate program, and therefore a State that refused to comply with a 
new, separate program could not be penalized by having its Medi-
caid funds revoked.250 Chief Justice Roberts said that States were 
surprised by the expansion because the expansion was completely 
separate from the original Medicaid bill.251 If any of the suggested 
Title IX policies or programs became required, Congress would 
have to argue that the programs are not different from Title IX. 
When Title IX was passed, it aimed to address “access to higher ed-
ucation, athletics, career education, employment, learning environ-
ment, math and science, sexual harassment, standardized testing, 
and treatment of pregnant and parenting students.”252 Even in the 
most extreme case of a federally implemented consent standard, the 
requirement would still aim toward the goals of Title IX—
promoting access to higher education and addressing sexual harass-
ment. Therefore, it would be hard for universities, to argue that they 
are surprised by an amendment to Title IX. Additionally, if univer-
sities no longer wish to comply with Title IX requirements, they are 
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free to choose the option of not complying—so long as they are will-
ing to lose their federal funding. 
However, the consequence of violating Title IX is to lose all fed-
eral funding.253 Therefore, although an amendment to Title IX might 
be viewed as the same program as Title IX, Title IX as it stands now 
might violate the Spending Clause because the federal government 
threatens to take away all federal funding from a university, rather 
than just funding conditioned on enforcing Title IX.254 Unlike in the 
case of Medicaid, where a State receives additional money to fund 
its Medicaid programs, under Title IX a university does not receive 
additional funds—it simply retains the funds it already receives 
from the federal government, but stands to lose the funds if it is 
found in noncompliance. Therefore, under NFIB it can be similarly 
argued that Congress would be penalizing universities for not com-
plying with one program, Title IX, by revoking funding received 
from unrelated, separate programs that have nothing to do with Title 
IX. 
b. Title IX Amendments Might Be Coercive Under NFIB 
Under Dole, the amount of money South Dakota stood to lose—
a mere five percent of its federal highway funding—was noted in 
the case.255 In NFIB, the loss of funding at risk became a pivotal 
factor. Similarly to NFIB, a university that does not comply with 
Title IX stands to lose all of its federal funding.256 There has yet to 
be a university that has had its federal funding revoked for being in 
violation of Title IX; however, that fact should not be dispositive 
because it is the threat of having the money revoked that would 
compel the university to comply.257 
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Unlike Medicaid, which could amount to ten percent of a State’s 
overall budget, an individual university losing its federal funding 
would likely have less of an impact on the entire State’s budget, alt-
hough a devastating impact on an individual university’s budget. 
According to one scholar, Title IX is not coercive because the entire 
State’s federal education funding is not at risk, but merely the 
amount of funding the individual school gets.258 The argument is 
compelling; a State might not be compelled by amendments to Title 
IX because an individual university’s federal funding is much less 
than the State’s federal education budget, and therefore there will be 
only a small impact on the State’s overall budget. On a strictly eco-
nomic basis, there is less risk of “economic dragooning”259 of an 
entire State with Title IX. 
However, the analysis of compulsion should not end there. The 
plurality opinion in NFIB took many factors into consideration and 
did not end the analysis after only considering the economic impact 
on the States’ overall budgets if Medicaid funding were revoked.260 
Chief Justice Roberts evoked the core federalism principles, arguing 
that Congress cannot commandeer the States to regulate for it.261 
Here, similarly to Printz and New York, if Congress expanded Title 
IX it would commandeer the individual universities, which are state 
agents, to comply with the amendments. An individual university, 
including private universities, relies substantially on funding from 
the state and the federal government. Yale University, for example, 
relied on $512.6 million dollars from the federal government for 
grants and contract income.262 Harvard University received $610.6 
million of federal funding for sponsored projects.263 If the OCR 
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pulled funding from universities that rely substantially on federal 
funding, those universities could be forced to close their doors. 
Therefore, like Printz, where the state municipal agencies were 
commandeered by a federal bill,264 here the universities are being 
forced to comply with Title IX. Each university is therefore left with 
the choice of complying with Title IX and receiving Congress’ fed-
eral grant or being found in violation of Title IX and having to close 
its doors. Similarly to New York, the universities are forced to 
“choose” between two decisions, both of which are prompted by 
Congress’ regulation. 
Without the Court explaining where the point is where “pressure 
turns into compulsion,”265 there is no clear answer whether Congress 
would exceed its Spending Clause authority by expanding universi-
ties Title IX requirements. However, it seems that, under NFIB’s 
plurality, any path of considerations that leads to compulsion would 
violate the Spending Clause. When applying the considerations 
gathered from the plurality opinion of NFIB to the expansion of Title 
IX, some of the considerations are left unchecked. Title IX would 
not fall under an “independent constitutional bar,” a limitation ex-
pressed in Dole, because it safeguards against gender discrimina-
tion. Additionally, Title IX provides a platform for cooperative fed-
eralism, allowing the universities to implement and enforce their 
own misconduct policies subject to minimum federal standards. 
Despite the positives of Title IX, any amendments might exceed 
the point where “pressure turns into compulsion.”266 Title IX could 
confuse voters and create an issue of political accountability. Addi-
tionally, and most importantly, a university that chooses not to com-
ply with Title IX would have all its federal funding revoked, rather 
than separate funds conditioned on its compliance.267 Under NFIB, 
universities that rely heavily on federal funding will be coerced into 
complying with Title IX or risk having to shut down. Therefore, it 
                                                                                                             
 264 See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 913 (1997) (where the 
Court found the federal government could not commandeer the state police offic-
ers to regulate on their behalf). 
 265 S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (citing to Charles. C. Steward 
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–90 (1937)). 
 266 Again, this language is from the brief federalism analysis in Dole. Dole, 
483 U.S. at 211. 
 267 ED Act Now, supra note 6. 
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is likely that Congress amending Title IX to make a more encom-
passing statute that meets the needs of society and addresses the is-
sues that it originally intended to would be unconstitutional under 
NFIB. 
3. GOING FORWARD 
a. Congress Could Create a Separate Fund That Attaches 
to Title IX Conditions 
If Congress wanted to amend Title IX, it could allocate a sepa-
rate portion of funds for universities to receive when they comply 
with Title IX. An amendment would have a better chance of with-
standing the NFIB coercion test if universities were only risking 
money specifically tied to Title IX, rather than all of their federal 
funds. By doing so, Congress would eliminate the threat of Title IX 
being interpreted as a separate program for which a State’s noncom-
pliance would lead to a revocation of separate funds, like the Medi-
caid expansion. 
However, the danger of creating a separate fund for universities 
to receive upon meeting the conditions required in Title IX is rooted 
in the very “choice” of the States that the Court in New York and 
NFIB advocated for.268 Although the right of a State to choose is the 
exact principle of federalism that the Court in New York and NFIB 
desired, there is a heightened risk of discrimination in a situation 
where a university does not comply with Title IX. The risk of losing 
all federal funding is a strong incentive for universities to comply 
with Title IX. Without such a strong incentives, universities might 
be less inclined to comply with Title IX. Therefore, any university 
could choose to not comply with Title IX and risk losing a smaller 
portion of money. A university that violates Title IX is subjecting 
its students to an environment absent basic procedural safeguards 
for sexual assault victims and creating a disparate impact on female 
students, who are sexually assaulted at a higher rate.269 Allowing 
                                                                                                             
 268 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175–76 (1992). See also 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605–07 (2012). 
 269 CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., supra note 3; Statistics About Sexual Vio-
lence, NATIONAL SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE CENTER, 
http://nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/publications_nsvrc_factsheet_media-
packet_statistics-about-sexual-violence_0.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (finding 
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universities the “right to choose” to comply with Title IX would not 
be appropriate because it would be allowing the universities the 
“right to choose” to subject their students to a discriminatory envi-
ronment. Therefore, if Congress creates separate funding for univer-
sities to receive upon accepting the condition of an amendment to 
Title IX, Congress would risk universities rejecting Title IX amend-
ments and fostering gender-based discrimination. 
Additionally, under NFIB, one might argue that the only people 
affected by a State’s decision to not comply with the Medicaid ex-
pansion are the people living within that State. Therefore, if the peo-
ple in that State disagree with that State’s decisions, they can elect 
new representatives and hold the current politicians accountable. 
However, if a university does not comply with Title IX, a student’s 
only remedy is to leave the university. Universities that choose not 
to comply with Title IX, while other universities do, will create a 
patchwork of sexual assault policies throughout the over 7,000 
higher-education institutes in the United States.270 
b. The Fourteenth Amendment: Title IX’s Last Hope 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[no] State shall . . . 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.”271 Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Congress has the power to pass legislation enforcing the Four-
teenth Amendment.272  If a constitutional question regarding Con-
gress’ authority to pass Title IX or an amendment to Title IX graces 
the courts, the Fourteenth Amendment provides a strong basis for 
congressional authority to protect the liberty of an individual to be 
educated and the equal protection for all students to attend a univer-
sity free of discrimination. 
                                                                                                             
that one out of five college females experience attempted or completed sexual 
assault, while one out of sixteen men experience attempted or completed sexual 
assault). 
 270 Institute of Educational Sciences, Fast Facts, NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
EDUCATION STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=84 (last vis-
ited Jan. 24, 2014). 
 271 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. 
 272 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5.  
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Assuming a university is an actor of the state, a university cannot 
deprive any person of his or her liberty. A university might argue 
that, by virtue of its acceptance policies, it has the right to deny 
someone access to education at its own facilities.273 However, a uni-
versity does not have the right to deny someone of his or her auton-
omy because that would be an abridgment of a person’s liberty. Cre-
ating an environment, or allowing one to thrive, where students do 
not have the autonomy to move around freely without the threat of 
being sexually assaulted would abridge those students of their lib-
erty. Therefore, it can be argued that Congress passing any legisla-
tion, including an expansion of Title IX, that protects a student’s 
liberty to receive an education and to exist without fear of being 
sexually assaulted may be passed pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection of individual liberties. 
Additionally, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Congress has the authority to enact laws that afford all people equal 
protection of the law.274 Females are generally afforded equal pro-
tection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment because sex-
based regulations are subject to intermediate scrutiny.275 Addition-
ally, Title IX ensures equal access to education regardless of gen-
der.276 Campus sexual assaults have a disparate effect on female stu-
dents. One out of five college females experience attempted or com-
pleted sexual assault, compared to one out of sixteen men.277 Female 
                                                                                                             
 273 Education as a fundamental liberty has been debated. See generally Timo-
thy D. Lynch, Education As A Fundamental Right: Challenging The Supreme 
Courts Jurisprudence, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 953 (1998) (arguing that education is 
a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, despite the Supreme 
Court’s inconsistent jurisprudence); Brown v. Board of 
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education as a fundamental right). But see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. 
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not a fundamental right that guarantees students from poor school districts the 
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 274 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5. 
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scrutiny to a sex-based regulation). 
 276 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2014). 
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students are being sexually assaulted at alarmingly high rates on col-
lege campuses, creating an undue burden for female students to sur-
pass in order to receive an education. If the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment affords the same protections to males 
as to females, females should be able to attend universities without 
the undue burden of fearing that they will be sexually assaulted. 
While Title IX ensures equal access to education regardless of gen-
der, gender has not yet been declared a protected class. However, 
because Title IX ensures equal access to education regardless of 
gender, including sex, Congress could uphold amendments to Title 
IX under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
absent a substantial government interest. 
While Congress’ power under the Spending Clause is limited 
and uncertain, the Fourteenth Amendment provides a basis for Con-
gress to enforce and amend Title IX. Title IX protects the liberty of 
education in a nondiscriminatory environment and creates equal ac-
cess to education regardless of gender. Therefore, Congress could 
have enacted Title IX, and any subsequent amendments, pursuant to 
its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.278 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, by analyzing the Spending Clause in NFIB under 
deep-rooted federalism principles, Chief Justice Roberts made it 
nearly impossible for Congress to strike a healthy nexus between the 
State and Federal Government under the Spending Clause. For Title 
IX to have the expansive success of VAWA and address the needs 
of college campuses today, Congress will have to cleverly work 
around the NFIB holding. It will be difficult and unlikely for Title 
IX to see progress under the new NFIB Spending Clause. Congress’ 
                                                                                                             
 278 It is outside of the scope of this paper to discuss at length the intricacies of 
grounding Title IX in the Fourteenth Amendment. For more on the topic of Con-
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strongest option to amend Title IX to include more services and pro-
tections for victims may be to root any Title IX legislation in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
